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Abstract—Cyber security has grown up to be a hot
issue in recent years. How to identify potential malware
becomes a challenging task. To tackle this challenge, we
adopt deep learning approaches and perform flow detection
on real data. However, real data often encounters an
issue of imbalanced data distribution which will lead to
a gradient dilution issue. When training a neural network,
this problem will not only result in a bias toward the
majority class but show the inability to learn from the
minority classes.
In this paper, we propose an end-to-end trainable Tree-
Shaped Deep Neural Network (TSDNN) which classifies
the data in a layer-wise manner. To better learn from
the minority classes, we propose a Quantity Dependent
Backpropagation (QDBP) algorithm which incorporates the
knowledge of the disparity between classes. We evaluate
our method on an imbalanced data set. Experimental result
demonstrates that our approach outperforms the state-of-
the-art methods and justifies that the proposed method is
able to overcome the difficulty of imbalanced learning. We
also conduct a partial flow experiment which shows the
feasibility of real-time detection and a zero-shot learning
experiment which justifies the generalization capability of
deep learning in cyber security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security has become an important issue that
cannot be overlooked. Recently, a notorious type of
Ransomware, WannaCry, has posed a threat to the entire
cyber society. This Ransomware has appeared numerous
kinds of variants so far and the third version whose
targeted vulnerability differs from others has come into
existence as well.
Traditional methods to defend these threats are sig-
nature oriented, which means that anti-virus software
will not be able to detect them if malware changes its
behavior. On the other hand, real-time detection is also
a concern when applying anti-virus software.
Recently, many literature [1], [2] proposed different
methods to detect malware. Even though the methods
mentioned in these literature can achieve a high ac-
curacy, we discover that the precision, which is also
an important index in machine learning tasks, of the
proposed methods aren’t high. To seek for a substantial
improvement on the precision of malware detection
and perform a detailed classification, we construct a
neural network-based model based on our understanding
regarding neural network’s potential and generalization
capability.
Deep learning has an excellent performance in many
aspects such as computer vision task [3] and speech
recognition task [4] to name a few. With the emergence
of various types of neural network architectures and dif-
ferent training mechanisms, deep learning has become a
feasible and powerful approach when handling problems
with complexity.
Data is an important issue in building a robust model.
Unlike computer vision tasks that data are available on
the Internet with ease since there are numerous open data
sets, on the contrary, to the authors’ best knowledge, the
task we are conducting does not have any malware open
data set and therefore the malware data samples used in
this task are collected by authors. Under this situation,
the collected data will often result in an imbalanced data
distribution.
Imbalanced data distribution occurs quite frequently
in many machine learning related tasks [5], [6] and this
issue will become a major challenge in training neural
networks due to the gradient dilution issue. Besides, the
number of malware we obtained is even less than we
expected. How to construct a robust and unbiased model
becomes a challenging problem in our task.
To tackle the above-mentioned challenge, we propose
an end-to-end trainable Tree-Shaped Deep Neural Net-
work (TSDNN) along with a Quantity Dependent Back-
propagation (QDBP) algorithm which incorporates the
knowledge of the disparity between classes and classifies
the data layer by layer. We evaluate the effectiveness of
our method on a considerably imbalanced data set. The
main contributions of this paper are summarized as the
following:
• We propose an end-to-end trainable TSDNN model
which classifies the data in a layer-wise manner.
It is shown experimentally to perform far beyond
the multi-layer perceptron architecture on an imbal-
anced data set.
• We propose a QDBP algorithm which incorporates
the knowledge of the disparity between classes
and overcome the difficulty of imbalanced learning.
Experimental result shows that our method outper-
forms the state-of-the-art approaches on an imbal-
anced data set whether in accuracy or precision.
• We further show the feasibility of real-time detec-
tion by executing a partial flow experiment and978-1-5386-3531-5/17/$31.00 c© 2017 IEEE
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we also conduct a zero-shot learning experiment
which demonstrates the generalization performance
of deep learning on cyber security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section presents the state-of-the-art methods to
tackle imbalanced data issue. Section III introduces the
terminologies used in this paper and describes the phe-
nomenon of gradient dilution. The proposed algorithm
and the architecture of neural network are elaborated in
section IV. Section V presents the experimental frame-
work and provides comprehensive experimental results.
Eventually, we conclude this paper in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Imbalanced data distribution is an inevitable issue
when performing classification tasks. There are many
literature [5], [6] aimed at tackling the challenge, and
the proposed methods can be categorized into two main
strategies, data manipulating techniques and training
mechanism adjustment.
A. Data Manipulating Technique
There are two types of data manipulating techniques,
the oversampling method [7] and the undersampling
method [8]. Oversampling is a method that constantly
re-samples the minority class into the training data set.
Undersampling, on the other hand, is a method that
randomly eliminates the data of the majority class. Even
though these two methods are opposed to each other,
both of them are aimed to adjust the data distribution
and mitigate the imbalanced data issue.
B. Training Mechanism Adjustment
Incremental learning is a feasible method to mitigate
imbalanced data issue [9]. The objective of incremental
learning is intended to learning from the newly intro-
duced data without forgetting past memories. The model
usually trains on a small data set initially and increases
the size of training data set gradually.
III. GRADIENT DILUTION
Training neural networks is a gradient-based method
which updates the parameters according to the partial
derivatives computed with respect to the cost function.
When computing gradient in each epoch, the number
of the gradient contributed by each class equals to the
vector summation over the training data of each class.
If the number of the data of the majority class is much
greater than that of the minority class, the model will
tend to update the parameter toward the majority class.
To understand the phenomenon, we have to analyze the
computation of gradient when training a neural network.
For each epoch, every training sample will be trained
by the model once. Namely, the model will update
its parameters with respect to each data once in every
epoch. The total gradient of each epoch will be the sum
of all gradients contributed by each individual training
data and the mathematical formula is given by:
∂Loss
∂θ
=
N∑
i=1
∂Lossi
∂θ
(1)
where ∂Loss∂θ refers to the total gradient of each
epoch with respect to θ, ∂Lossi∂θ refers to the gradient
contributed by the ith training data with respect to θ,
and N represents the number of training data samples
in each epoch.
If we reorder equation (1), and group the gradient
contributed by the same class together, we will have
∂Loss
∂θ
=
∑
Mi∈M
∑
Aik∈Mi
∂LossAik
∂θ
(2)
where M represents the training data set, Mi refers
to the ith class of M , Aik is the kth data of Mi, and
LossAik is the loss contributed by data Aik.
From equation (2), we can observe that the number
of updates of parameter θ with respect to each class
depends on the size of each class. Once the number of
the data disparate between classes severely, the model
will tend to bias toward the majority class since the
total gradient will be dominated by the gradients con-
tributed by the majority class in terms of frequency.
This phenomenon will result in the insensitivity of the
model toward the minority classes because the model
seldom updates the parameter with respect to the minor-
ity classes. Metaphorically, the gradients contributed by
the minority classes fade as if it were diluted by that
contributed by the majority class. This phenomenon is
called the gradient dilution.
For instance, considering a binary classification on
an imbalanced data set where positive class contains
10,000 pieces of data whereas only 10 pieces of data
belongs to the negative class. For every epoch, the model
will update the parameters toward the direction of the
positive class 10,000 times while only updates 10 times
toward the direction of the negative class. Under this
scenario, the model will tend to bias toward the positive
class since the model updates more frequently toward
the direction of the positive class.
The effect of the gradient dilution depends on the
number ratio of the data between classes. If the ratio
is large to some extent, 216,01545 in our task, the model
will be more likely to update toward the majority class
and result in an inability of the model to learn from the
minority classes. To mitigate the impact of the gradient
dilution without adjusting the distribution of the data,
we propose a QDBP algorithm which takes the disparity
between classes into consideration, adjust the sensitivity
of the model with respect to each class, and is able to
overcome this difficulty.
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Fig. 1. This model performs a 12-class classification in three stages. Firstly, the model performs a coarse classification which preliminarily
classifies the data into the class of benign flows and malicious flows. Secondly, the model conducts a multi-class classification on the malicious
flows, which classifies them into 5 different categories according to the attack behavior. Lastly, the model executes a fine-grained classification
on Ransomware family.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Quantity Dependent Backpropagation (QDBP)
Backpropagation is a gradient-based method to train
neural networks. The mathematical formula is given by:
θl
+
i = θ
l
i − η ×
∂Loss
∂θli
(3)
where θli and θi
l+ represent the ith parameter in layer l
and the updated parameter respectively, η is the learning
rate, ∂Loss
∂θli
refers to the partial derivative of Loss with
respect to θli.
However, neither backpropagation nor adaptive learn-
ing rate approaches can’t reflect the sensitivity toward
minority classes whether applying online learning or
batch learning mechanism since both methods treat each
class evenly and are only sensitive to gradient. When
imbalanced data distribution occurs, these methods will
result in the inability of the model to learn from the
minority classes due to gradient dilution issue.
To mitigate this issue, we introduce a vector F into
backpropagation (equation (3)) and propose a QDBP
algorithm which takes the disparity between classes into
consideration and shows different sensitivities toward
different classes. The mathematical formula is given by:
θl
+
i = θ
l
i − η · F · ∇Loss (4)
F =
[
c1
n1
,
c2
n2
, ...,
cN
nN
]
(5)
∇Loss =
[
∂Loss1
∂θi
,
∂Loss2
∂θi
, ...,
∂LossN
∂θi
]T
(6)
where F is a row vector, N represents the cardinality
of the training data set, ni represents the cardinality
of the class where the ith data belongs to, and ci is
the pre-selected coefficient for the class where the ith
data belongs to. The adjustment of ci depends on the
sensitivity of the model to the gradients contributed by
the data belonging to class Mi. ∇Loss is a column
vector composed of the partial derivatives of loss with
respect to θ contributed by each data. For example, if
the ith data belongs to class Mk, and the pre-selected
coefficient for class Mk is c, then ni = |Mk| and ci = c.
From equation (4), we can show that:
θl
+
i = θ
l
i − η
∑
Mt∈M
cMt
nMt
∑
Atk∈Mt
∂LossAtk
∂θi
(7)
M =
|M |⋃
t=1
Mt , Mt =
|Mt|⋃
k=1
Atk (8)
where M represents the training data set, Mt refers
to the tth class in M , and Atk is the kth data of Mt.
By selecting cMt to 1, ∀Mt ∈M ,
1
nMt
∑
Atk∈Mt
∂LossAtk
∂θi
can be viewed as the normal-
ized equivalent gradient computed by each data Atk,
∀Atk ∈Mt since nMt = |Mt|.
Under this mechanism, gradient dilution issue will
be mitigated since the total gradient contributed by
each class accounts for the same proportion in terms of
contribution. In our experiment, to reflect the sensitivity
of the minority class, the pre-selected coefficient for the
minority class is set to 1.2 while others remain 1.
B. Tree-Shaped Deep Neural Network (TSDNN)
To mitigate the imbalanced data issue, we propose an
end-to-end trainable TSDNN model (Fig. 1) which clas-
sifies the data layer by layer. We define each model in
TSDNN as a nodal network and the links between nodal
networks are called bridges. We adopt cross entropy as
the loss function and apply QDBP to each nodal network
to optimize the performance.
Unlike the architecture of a multi-layer perceptron
model which is a static structure, the model we proposed
grows and expands dynamically as the classification goes
more detailed.
As shown in Fig. 1 (a), we firstly combine all the
malware data into a group labeled ”Malicious” and
perform a coarse classification separating the malicious
flows from the benign ones. Under this scenario, the
number of the two classes does not exist a large disparity
compared to the distribution of the entire data set and
therefore the gradient dilution issue will hardly alter the
classification. After the preliminary classification, the
data labeled ”Malicious” will firstly be transferred into
a concatenation stage then fed into a subsequent nodal
network, which is the child of the current nodal network,
to further perform a detailed classification.
In the second layer of TSDNN (Fig. 1 (b)), we would
like to classify the malicious flows according to their
attack behavior. As far as the authors’ understanding,
the attack behavior of the malware can be categorized
into 5 categories as listed at the output end in Fig. 1
(b). Thus, the output dimension of the second nodal
network is set to 5. Instead of directly feeding the
output vector V o1 of the malicious flow calculated in
the first layer into current nodal network, the output
vector V o1 will firstly undergo a concatenation process
where we concatenate the input vector V i1 of the
malicious flow in the first layer with the output vector
V o1 computed by the first nodal network and regard
the resulting vector V i2 = [V i1,V o1] as the input
vector of the second nodal network. Namely, the input
vector V i2 of the second nodal network will consist
of two parts, the original vector V i1 of the malicious
flow and the learned feature V o1 computed by the first
nodal network. For example, if the input vector V i1 of
the first nodal network is V i1 = [ui1, ui2, ui3] and the
corresponding output vector V o1 is V o1 = [uo1, uo2],
the input vector of the second nodal network will be
given by V i2 = [ui1, ui2, ui3, uo1, uo2]. However, as the
classification goes finer, the imbalanced data distribution
will become more conspicuous meaning that the gradient
dilution issue will influence the performance. By suitably
selecting the coefficients ci for each class, QDBP can
still improve the performance. Afterwards, the data la-
beled ”Ransomware” will be fed into a succeeding nodal
network which is the child of the current nodal network
to further conduct a fine-grained classification.
Lastly, we conduct a fine-grained classification
demonstrated in Fig. 1 (c). In this layer, we classify
the data of the Ramsomware family in particular. As
described, the input vector V i3 of this nodal network
will incorporate the knowledge learned from the previ-
ous nodal networks. In other words, we concatenate the
output vectors V o1 and V o2 computed by the first and
second nodal networks respectively with the input vector
V i1 of the first nodal network and consider the resulting
vector V i3 = [V i1,V o1,V o2] as the input vector of
the current nodal network. Likewise, imbalanced data
distribution arises in this layer. By selecting suitable
coefficients ci for each class, we can still conquer the
difficulty caused by the gradient dilution issue.
Apart from the multi-layer perceptron which classi-
fies data altogether, we classify the data in a layer-
wise manner which can diminish the disparity between
classes when analyzing the data distribution in each
layer. Furthermore, the input vectors V i2 and V i3 of
the second and the third nodal networks are not directly
fed by the output vectors V o1 and V o2 of the preced-
ing nodal networks. Instead, the advantage of such a
hierarchical classification is that we can generate new
features V o1 and V o2 in each layer and incorporate
the learned features into the next level’s input vector
to further provide more information. Moreover, since
TSDNN is end-to-end trainable meaning that all the
nodal networks are trained simultaneously, TSDNN can
tune the output vector of each nodal network through
QDBP to improve the erroneous classification in the
learning phase. Another advantage is that TSDNN can
grow and expand dynamically, which differs from other
neural networks structurally. Namely, the more detailed
the classification is desired, the more layers and nodal
networks will be involved in TSDNN.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Data Collection
The malware traffic used in the experiments was
collected from September 2016 to May 2017 so as the
benign traffic. We record the first 6-minute network
behavior of the malicious samples obtained from Virus-
Total(https://www.virustotal.com) under sandbox.
The malicious data we collected are categorized into
5 different classes where each class represents differ-
ent attack behaviors. We further label the data of the
Ransomware family:Cryptomix, Locky, CrypMic, Tel-
slacrypt, CryptXXX, Cryptowall, Cerber, according to
the official name listed in VirusTotal. Therefore, our data
set is now composed of 12 different classes as illustrated
in Table I.
TABLE I
DATA STATISTICS
Class Number of Flows Size
Benign 246,015 560.2 MB
Bot 99 6.5 MB
Exploit 349 32.5 MB
Trojan 3,085 18.1 MB
Malspam 3,612 142.1 MB
Cryptomix 90 2.0 MB
Locky 229 9.3 MB
CrypMic 390 14.3 MB
Telslacrypt 755 26.5 MB
CryptXXX 1,259 44.7 MB
Cryptowall 2,864 34.7 MB
Cerber 23,260 23.5 MB
Total 282,007 914.4 MB
B. Feature Extraction
1) Connection Records: Referring to Williams et al.
[10], Internet protocols and connection statistics are
significant to the identification of traffic and flow. Thus,
we extract the connection records like port, IP, and
protocol information in traffic flows from the transport
layer. In addition, according to Anderson et al. [11] and
Tseng et al. [12], the information of the HTTP requests
and TLS handshake will play a crucial role in traffic
identification. These information can be obtained in TCP
payloads.
TABLE II
ACCURACY AND PRECISION OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES
Method Accuracy Precision
DNN + Backpropagation 59.08% 8.33%
DNN + Oversampling (10000 samples/class) [7] 85.18% 65.9%
DNN + Undersampling (45 samples/class) [8] 68.89% 49.45%
DNN + Incremental Learning [9] 78.84% 71.23%
DNN + QDBP 84.56% 62.3%
SVM (RBF) 83.87% 38.8%
Random Forest 98.9% 68.25%
TSDNN + QDBP 99.63% 85.4%
2) Network Packet Payload: TCP and UDP payloads
always contain the transmitted data, and the former are
sometimes sent encrypted under TLS or SSL protocols.
In order to trace the malicious flows and the accompa-
nied malware, the transmitted data of all payloads in a
flow is important and should be taken into consideration.
Hence, we extract all the payloads from each packet
where the length of each packet ranges from 0 to 1,500
bytes.
3) Flow Behavior: Flow behavior is described as a
way to monitor the sending process of packets whereas
each malware family possesses different flow behaviors.
According to Moore et al. [13], they proposed nearly
250 discriminators to classify the flow record. Among
these discriminators, inter-arrival time of each packet
in a flow plays the most important role in terms of
classification. Besides, from McGrew et al. [14], they
used Markov matrix to store the relationship between
sequential packets. Inspired by their methods, we apply
Markov transition matrix to represent the flow behavior
and document the before-and-after relationship.
C. Malicious Flow Detection and Layer-wise Analysis
1) Analysis on the Malicious Flow Detection: Firstly,
we would like to test if our model is able to distinguish
malicious flows from the benign ones. Referring to
Tseng et al. [12], their result could achieve a 93%
accuracy in malicious flow detection using only HTTP
headers and TCP payloads. However, after including the
new features mentioned in the previous section, we can
achieve an accuracy of 99% under vanilla backpropa-
gation. If we further apply QDBP, the recognition rate
can even improve to 99.7%. This evidence shows the
improvement from the past work [12] to current and
justifies that it is the feature that results in the improve-
ment under same training mechanism. On the other hand,
the subtle improvement contributed by QDBP indicates
that when the number of data in the minority class is
large to some extent, 35,992 in our task, the imbalanced
data distribution won’t be significant since the quantity
is large enough to construct a robust model.
2) Comparison of Different Approaches on Flow
Classification: In addition to detecting malicious flows,
we would like to further classify the malicious flows
more detailed into 11 different classes. In our task, there
are 246,015 flows belong to the ”Benign” class while
”Cryptomix” class only contains 90 flows. Such disparity
will result in an insensitive model which will misclassify
the data into the majority class if classifying the data
altogether through vanilla backpropagation. The result
is illustrated in Fig. 2. Fig. 2 is the confusion matrix
result of a 12-class classification, confusion matrix is
a concrete way to present the result of a multi-class
classification where true label represents the the ground
true label while the predicted label is the result that
given by the model. For example, if a data labeled ”Bot”
but predicted ”Exploit”, then the block corresponding
to that classification will be increased by 1. An ideal
confusion matrix will have a dark color in the diagonal
while others bright. From the confusion matrix shown in
Fig. 2, we can observe that all testing data is classified
into the ”Benign” class, where the shade of the color of
each block indicates the probability of the corresponding
classification.
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Fig. 2. Confusion matrix of a traditional DNN with 3 hidden layers.
The DNN is trained with the vanilla backpropagation algorithm.
However, from Table II, the accuracy of vanilla back-
propagation can still achieve 59% even if the model
bias toward the majority class since the testing data set
contains roughly 30 thousand benign samples and 20
thousand malicious samples. This shows that the accu-
racy is not a comprehensive evaluation index because it
can easily be manipulated by adjusting the distribution
of the testing data set.
To evaluate the model in a more precise manner,
we adopt another performance metrics called average
precision and the mathematical formula is given by:
Precisionavg =
1
N
N∑
i=1
TPi
TPi + FPi
(9)
where N represents the number of classes, N = 2
in the coarse classification and N = 12 in the 12-
class classification. TPi and FPi stand for True Positive
and False Positive of class i respectively. Precision is
one of the performance metrics which represents the
ratio between the correctly classified samples and the
total data in each class. This performance metrics won’t
be seriously affected by the existence of the majority
class since it calculates the average precision of each
class. Though the cardinality of the ”Benign” class is
extremely large, this performance metrics won’t bias
toward the majority class completely since it treats each
class evenly. From Table II, the precision of vanilla
backpropagation is 8.33% which can reasonably support
the phenomenon shown in Fig. 2.
To mitigate the influence of the imbalanced data
distribution, we structure our neural network to be
hierarchical and classify the data layer by layer. Under
this setting, the data distribution in each layer will be
more balanced compared to prior methods. We can
reduce the quantity ratio between the majority class and
the minority class from 216,01545 to
14,423
50 which nearly
shrinks the ratio by 17 times. Besides, we apply QDBP
in each layer to further improve the gradient dilution
issue.
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Fig. 3. Confusion matrix of TSDNN. TSDNN is trained with QDBP
in each nodal network.
From the confusion matrix shown in Fig. 3, our
method enhances the performance of classifying the
entire imbalanced data set not only in the classification
accuracy where the accuracy is improved from 59.08%
to 99.63% but in the sensitivity of the model where the
precision is improved from 8.33% to 85.4%. We further
conclude that the superior performance in training an
imbalanced data set has to ascribe to two factors, the
TSDNN model which diminishes the disparity in each
layer and the proposed QDBP algorithm which mitigates
the gradient dilution issue.
We also compare the result with the state-of-the-art
methods [7], [8], [9] mentioned in the related work
section. As illustrated in Table II, the performance of
the vanilla backpropagation is seriously affected by the
gradient dilution issue because the cardinality of ”Bot”
and ”Cryptomix” classes is much smaller than that of
”Benign” class. Even though the state-of-the-art methods
can improve the performance of classification, these
methods still can’t resolve the gradient dilution issue.
If incorporating QDBP into TSDNN, the recognition
rate can even achieve 99.63% in accuracy and 85.4% in
precision which outperforms other approaches whether
in accuracy or in precision.
D. Partial Flow Detection
For the sake of real-time detection, we devise an
experiment by dividing each attack into fractions and
only consider a portion of the data to test the potentiality
of being a malware.
As illustrated in Fig. 4, the recognition rate of mali-
cious flow detection ascends as the portion of the data
increases. Besides, from the result shown in Fig. 4, we
can conclude that our model is able to distinguish the
malicious flow by only considering the first 5 percent
of the entire flow which shows the possibility of a real-
time detection since the model can perceive the potential
threats in the very beginning of the process without
analyzing the entire flow.
Partial Flow Experiment
Flow Percentage (%)
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cc
ur
ac
y 
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)
Fig. 4. In the 6 minutes of each attack, our model can achieve
95% accuracy perceiving malicious flows in the first 5 percent of the
duration, namely 18 seconds. The first part of flows in the connection
gives enough clues for alerting malicious attacks.
E. Zero-shot Learning
There are various kinds of malware existing in the
cyber society. However, it is impossible to collect data
samples of each family since there are many new
variants coming into existence every day. To evaluate
the generalization performance of the proposed model,
we would like to examine the ability of TSDNN to
identify some malware that has never been trained by
our model. This kind of scenario is coined as a ”zero-
shot learning” in machine learning term. Therefore, we
collect 14 different kinds of malware (Fig. 5) to evaluate
the ability of our model to perceive potential threats and
the experimental result is illustrated in Fig. 5.
From the experimental results, we can observe that
our model performs reasonably well on recognizing
these malware. In real world, each attack usually has
several network flows. Once any part of these flows is
recognized as a malicious connection, the attack will be
blocked and the process will be terminated immediately.
This result not only shows the ability to predict potential
threats but further justifies that a behavior-oriented ap-
proach to detect malware is a better way compared to the
traditional signature-based methods, which also accounts
for the generalization capability of deep learning.
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Toga (241 flows)          
WannaCry (709 flows) 
Adylkuzz (5683 flows)
Recognition rate (%)
Fig. 5. The new malware data set contains 14 different families which
are different from that used in training TSDNN.
VI. CONCLUSION
We propose an end-to-end trainable TSDNN model
along with a QDBP algorithm, which enables the model
to memorize and learn from the minority class, to
perform malicious flow detection. Unlike the multi-layer
perceptron architecture which classifies the data alto-
gether, we classify the data in a layer-wise manner. We
further conduct a partial flow detection which is meant
to seek for the possibility of real-time detection by only
considering a portion rather than the entire flow. From
the experimental result, real-time detection can truly
be fulfilled. To evaluate our model’s ability to detect
potential malware, we execute an experiment on testing
the malware that has never been trained by our model.
The experimental results show that our model is able
to accurately detect the potential malware at a superior
performance which also justifies that behavior-oriented
approach is better than signature-oriented methods when
detecting malware.
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